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Beriberi has long been recognized as being of special significance among the
avitaminoses. It was not the first disease to be associated with a specific nutritional
deficiency, but the researches of Christian Eijkman into polyneuritis in the early years of
this century, and Casimir Funk's apparent isolation of an anti-beriberi factor in 1911, led
to the discovery and identification of vitamins and to important developments in the
science and practice of nutrition.' Vitamin B1, or thiamine, was first isolated from rice
polishings by the Dutch research workers W F Donath and B C P Jansen in 1926, and
was first synthesized ten years later by the American Robert R Williams and his co-
workers. Those involved in this research were impressed by its signifiance: for Jansen,
the beriberi research generated the modem science of nutrition; for Williams it paved the
way for the elimination of a disease that had brought suffering and death to millions.2
During the 1920s, commercial companies had developed techniques for adding vitamins
to processed foods, a process known as fortification,3 and following the synthesis of
thiamine, Williams became convinced that the eradication of beriberi might be achieved
by the distribution ofthiamine-enriched rice in countries where the disease was endemic.
The path from Funk's insight to the implementing ofrice enrichment programmes was
far from smooth, however, either scientifically or administratively. Between 1911 and
1933, scientists struggled to elucidate the anti-beriberi vitamin, while the question of
whether to encourage the enrichment of rice supplies with synthetic thiamine became an
issue ofimportance for the food and health agencies ofthe United Nations in the decades
after World War II. Superficially unrelated, the scientific arena of the 1920s and 1930s,
and the administrative policy arena of the 1950s and 1960s were linked by the field
observations of two British scientists, W R Aykroyd and B S Platt, whose early work on
beriberi carried them to positions of influence in the world of international agencies and
global policies which emerged as a principal determinant of change in developing
countries after 1945.4 It was Williams's view in later years that Platt and Aykroyd were
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responsible for obstructing the international sponsorship of the rice-enrichment policies
on which he was himself determined and this disappointment clouded his sense of
personal achievement.5 At the personal level, this disagreement over rice-enrichment
provides an intriguing example of divergence in scientific styles; in the wider context of
the history of nutrition and of development policy, it has implications for our
understanding ofthe long-term patterns ofdevelopment ofthese disciplines.
The history of the modern discipline of applied nutrition has been bedevilled by a
continuing tension between technical fixes and structural policies-between "vertical"
and "horizontal" solutions-within the international nutrition community.6 Although
Michael Worboys has argued that nutrition was transformed "from being conceptualized
as a major structural problem into being conceptualized as a technical problem" just
before World War II,7 the story of the rice enrichment controversy shows that the
structural convictions of individuals continued to exert an influence on the policies
adopted towards specific nutritional problems, even within a context in which technical
solutions had achieved general dominance. In the transition from malnutrition as a
colonial problem to malnutrition as an international concern which took place in the
early 1940s, technical solutions by no means replaced structural planning as the
dominant ethos of the international nutrition community.
Wallace Aykroyd, Benjamin Platt and the Emergence of
International Nutrition Policies
Food and nutrition were not prominent concerns of classical tropical medicine or of
colonial administrators in the first decades of the twentieth century. In the mid-1920s,
however, John Boyd Off and John Gilks first reported on the poor nutritional status of
indigenous African peoples, while the Indian researches of Robert McCarrison were
helping to focus the attention of colonial medical officers on nutritional problems. While
the African study stimulated further surveys of local colonial nutrition, McCarrison's
researches helped to shape opinion on how nutritional problems should be tackled.8
Although much of McCarrison's work was focused on specific deficiency diseases, he
laid great emphasis on the importance of natural foods in the diet. Thus his best-known
publication, Studies in deficiency disease (1921), declared that the usual diet need only
be reinforced by "natural foodstuffs in sufficient quantities to provide an adequate supply
of vitamins, suitable protein, and salts for the varying needs of individuals".
Significantly, he noted the dangers inherent in the sub-division of vitamins into many
classes: "Vitamins, like other essential constituents of food, are not to be regarded as
independent of the assistance derivable from their associates in the maintenance of
nutritional harmony. Each vitamin is but a member of a team, and the team itself but a
part of a co-ordinated whole".9 The influence of this holistic view of nutrition, which
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Worboys suggests led colonial medical officers to argue the importance of the general
effects ofdiet as against attention to specific deficiency disease (a structural rather than a
technical solution), extended beyond the colonial medical service. It related to nutritional
concerns at home in Britain, and in this respect shaped the intellectual background of
young scientists coming into the nutrition field in the later 1920s.
Ever since the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration had reported in
1904 that incorrect choice of food was "prominent among the causes to which
degenerative tendencies might be assigned", nutrition had formed a continuing theme in
British public health concern.'0 By the inter-war period, there was a rising interest in the
social and economic context of nutrition. As A L Bacharach, then a researcher at the
Glaxo nutrition research laboratories, later noted, "an increasing interest in the scientific
bases of nutrition accompanied a growing awareness that diet and health were closely
connected . . . People were beginning to wonder . .. at the patent correlation between
disease and poverty"." l Dietary surveys in Britain and elsewhere established links
between low incomes, inadequate diets and poor health, while the publication, in 1932,
ofAudrey Richards' dietary study ofthe Bemba people ofNorthern Rhodesia brought an
anthropological perspective to the emergent discipline of nutrition. "The fact is," wrote
Richards, "that nutrition in human society cannot even be considered apart from the
cultural medium in which it is carried on".12
It was against this complicated intellectual background that Wallace Aykroyd and Ben
Platt embarked on their own studies ofberiberi in the years between 1925 and 1932.
Aykroyd's Study ofBeriberi
Beriberi, which is caused by lack of thiamine in the diet, was widely prevalent in the
Far East in the 1920s. It was endemic in India, China, Hong Kong and Japan, in
Malaysia, the East Indies and the Philippines; it was also reported from all parts of
Africa, and was a serious problem in South America and the West Indies.13 As with other
deficiency diseases, scientific research into the causes of beriberi was largely dominated
by the laboratory in the early years of the century.'4 After 1918, however, medical
interest in the tropics expanded, and with the establishment ofcolonial research institutes
and of research interest among local doctors, the etiology and epidemiology of beriberi
also began to receive attention. In India, Robert McCarrison began his 'Beriberi Inquiry'
under the auspices of the Indian Research Fund Association in 1918; the Far Eastern
Association of Tropical Medicine was extensively preoccupied with the disease at its
meetings of 1921, 1923 and 1925; in Canada, the presence of beriberi in Newfoundland
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began to cause concern; and in China the newly established Henry Lester Institute for
Medical Research included beriberi among its clinical research interests. During the
1920s, therefore, two distinct strands of interest in beriberi developed. On the one hand
there were the scientists working to isolate the anti-beriberi factor, on the other there
were those who were additionally concerned with the behaviour of the disease in the
field.
Wallace Ruddell Aykroyd (1899-1979) belonged to the latter group. After qualifying
MB at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1924, Aykroyd went out to St John's, Newfoundland,
as a house surgeon.15 Here he became interested in deficiency diseases, which he took as
the subject of his MD thesis, completed in 1928. He was particularly concerned with
beriberi, which was endemic among the isolated fishing communities of Newfoundland
and Labrador in the winter months, and was awarded a Beit Medical Research
Fellowship to pursue this interest. His findings were published in article form in 1930.16
From the beginning, Aykroyd was aware of the wider implications of his study. "While
such work would be of scientific interest", he wrote in his fellowship application, "it
would have an important social bearing. Recommendations could be made to the
Newfoundland government as to the best way of dealing with their food problem".
Significantly he added, "Beriberi has not so far been studied clinically with reference to
laboratory research work of recent years".'7 The observations which Aykroyd made
during the course of his study confirmed his initial lines of thought, shaped his approach
to health and nutrition, and, as his career developed, became influential in shaping
international approaches to nutritional problems.
Aykroyd's beriberi study is a small masterpiece of epidemiological observation and
analysis. Drawing on hospital records, and information supplied by local doctors, he
began by noting that beriberi had become common among the Newfoundland coastal
communities in the early years of the twentieth century, and had been endemic ever
since. In the 1920s, however, it had become increasingly less frequent. The appearance
of beriberi was associated with the replacement of wholemeal by white flour as a staple
winter food. By custom and necessity, the outlying communities of Newfoundland laid in
winter stores during November and December to last them through to the following May
and June, when the snows vanished and communication with the outside world again
became possible. In the late spring months, notably among the poorest families, food
shortages became pressing; the seasonal curve of hospital admissions for deficiency
diseases, including beriberi, showed a clear peak in April, May and June. Careful inquiry
revealed that the families who suffered from these diseases were the very poorest, whose
diet was rapidly reduced to white bread, with some salt meat and molasses, in the winter.
Families on slightly higher incomes, whose stores included a fair supply of potatoes, did
not suffer from beriberi.18
The conclusions which Aykroyd drew from this study were plainly informed by
consideration of the wider problem of tropical beriberi. The findings with regard to
Newfoundland were clear: here beriberi was "indirectly the result of poverty and the
15 'R. P.', 'Wallace Ruddell Aykroyd', Lancet, 1" W R Aykroyd, Application for a Beit Memorial
1979, i: 450. Medical Research Fellowship, Beit Grant
16 W R Aykroyd, 'Beriberi and other food- Applications, Contemporary Medical Archives
deficiency diseases in Newfoundland and Labrador', Centre (CMAC), SA/BE/A- 120.
J. Hyg., 1930, 30: 357-86. I Ackroyd, op. cit., note 16 above, pp. 357-65.
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difficulties, due to hard climate, which attend the production and transport of foodstuffs.
Itsprevention is an economic rather than a medicalproblem" (my italics).19 This was the
crux of the matter as far as Aykroyd was concerned. Moreover, he looked beyond the
Newfoundland experience to focus on tropical beriberi. "In connexion with
Newfoundland beriberi", he continued, "there is no necessity, as perhaps exists in the
case of tropical beriberi, for attempting to alter ingrained food habits". While the
introduction of white flour had caused the problem, the reintroduction of whole-wheat
flour would not resolve it: wholewheat flour has poor keeping qualities, and in the
circumstances, good keeping qualities were essential. With the insight that was to
dominate his later thinking and writing on the subject of nutrition, he then noted:
"Moreover, whole-meal flour would check only one dietary deficiency and it is wiser to
aim at general all round improvement. It is possible that more headway would be made
with beriberi in the tropics ifadministrators would come to regard it, not as a question of
polished or unpolished rice, but simply as a problem of poverty".20 If tropical peoples
could afford a wider range offoods, in other words, tropical beriberi would disappear.
Although Aykroyd had perhaps derived some inspiration from McCarrison, who, he
noted, "seems to be approaching this view", it was his own experience in Newfoundland
that opened his eyes to the relationship between poverty and nutritional deficiency.2' His
thesis had attracted the attention of Charles Martin and Harriette Chick at the Lister
Institute in London, who sponsored his Beit fellowship,22 and were probably
instrumental in his appointment, in 1931, as "Secretary-Investigator" in Nutrition to the
League of Nations Health Section; an appointment which made him at once "one of the
first international civil servants and the first international nutrition worker".23 For the rest
ofhis life, his principal work was to be in the organization ofresearch, "in the collection,
co-ordination and ordering of information, and the administration of practical work for
the prevention ofmalnutrition"24
It was from the League of Nations that Aykroyd published, with his colleague Etienne
Burnet, the highly influential report 'Nutrition and public health' in 1935.25 While the
report as a whole addressed the general issue of state-sponsored work in nutrition for
public health ends, part of the sub-section 'New directions' specifically addressed the
'colonial dietary problem'.26 Here the consolidation and development of the views
Aykroyd had formulated while in Newfoundland are apparent. Among the individual
examples of public health nutrition work discussed was beriberi, of which the authors
noted that the problem of its international control was highly complex but worthy of
further study.27 The most significant passages occurred in the section on colonial dietary
19 Ibid., p. 375. 'Beri-beri columbarum', Indian J. med. Res. (Memoir
20 Ibid., p. 375. In this context it is worth noting No. 10), March 1928, pp. 1-146, and not to
Jennifer Beinart's observation: "It is not to be Deficiency disease. I have been unable to locate this
expected that a medical researcher in 1937 would particular volume.
analyse the relations ofproduction in [a] semi- 22 Lancet, op. cit., note 15 above, p. 450.
colonial setting ... and see that problems such as 23 'T. P. E.' (Trewavas Pearce Eddy), Br. Med. J.,
perennial indebtedness were probably more 1979, i: 544; Harriette Chick to Professor J Elliot, 4
fundamental causes ofpellagra among peasants than May 1931: CMAC SA/BE/A-120.
were vitamin shortage and worms": 'The inner world 24 Ibid.
ofimperial sickness', in Austoker and Bryder, op. 25 Burnet and Aykroyd, op. cit., note 13 above.
cit., note 10 above, pp. 123-4. 26 Ibid., pp. 448-53.
21 Aykroyd's reference was to Robert McCarrison, 27 Ibid., p. 433.
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problems. "In districts which suffer from avitaminoses", they observed, "means of
prevention may be found close to hand . . . policies of prevention should not involve
unnecessary disturbance of traditional dietary habits. It is preferable that the foodstuffs
necessary to supplement native diets should be bought locally". Education, they
considered, could achieve something: national and tribal dietary customs were "not
inviolable physiological laws"; native colonial populations were observed readily to adopt
the European habit of three meals a day, while millet-eating populations would accept rice
as a substitute in times of shortage.28 In the immediate pre-war period, there was little
enough time for international action to take the direction suggested by Aykroyd and
Burnet, but in 1945 Aykroyd was appointed Director of the Nutrition Division of the new
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).29 Both these themes, the
importance of easing malnutrition through local measures, and the value of education re-
emerged as central features ofthe FAO's nutrition policy underhis directorship after 1945.
Platt's Researches
While Aykroyd was evolving into a premier international civil servant in the service of
nutrition and public health between 1925 and 1945, a not dissimilar path, intellectually
and professionally, was being followed by Benjamin Stanley Platt (1903-1969).
Although the two men were very different in personality, both became central figures in
the emergence of nutrition as an international health concern. Aykroyd, genial,
diplomatic and guided by clear professional ideals, was to be a "leader in establishing
nutrition as a main component of public health programmes in many countries";30 Platt,
reserved, somewhat difficult, with great intellectual energy, became a pioneer in the
establishment of tropical nutrition as an academic discipline in both England and her
former empire.31
Just as Aykroyd discovered the economics of poverty in Newfoundland, so Platt
discovered them in China. Trained initially as a chemist, Platt obtained his PhD at Leeds
in 1926, and then qualified as a doctor in 1930. In 1925-26 and again in 1931-32, he
held Beit fellowships, but his financial circumstances necessitated secure employment,
and in 1932 he accepted the post of Associate in Medicine at the Henry Lester Institute
for Medical Research at Shanghai.32 The Henry Lester had been founded in 1927 under
the will of an English businessman, who left money for the establishment in China of"an
institute for the study of and the instruction in the English language in medical science,
surgery . . . and other useful and scientific knowledge".33 The moving spirit behind the
Henry Lester was Herbert Gastineau Earle (1882-1946), professor of physiology at the
University of Hong Kong since 1915, who acted first as adviser to the Lester Trustees
and subsequently as first Director of the Institute. Staff shortages in Hong Kong meant
28 Ibid., pp. 451-2. Eddy) noted that "either you were his friend or his
29 He spent the intervening decade as Director of enemy": Lancet, 1969, ii: 224.
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that most of Earle's time had been absorbed in teaching and administration, and he was
determined to create an institute whose primary end should be medical research. His
ambition had been focused by the contemporaneous creation of the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), which he used as a model for the Henry
Lester.34 It was Earle's hope that, since the LSHTM was to serve as a central institute for
the British Empire, it might "assist an institute established in China to bring into closer
contact the work ofBritish and Chinese scientists".35 In the event, there is no evidence of
contact between the two institutes, but Earle's hopes found fulfilment ofa sort when Platt
became the first Professor ofHuman Nutrition at the London School in 1946.
Earle's policy as Director of the Henry Lester was to emphasize that "disease is a
general biological problem and that all medical research should have a fundamental
philosophical background if it is to be intelligently pursued".36 Platt was clearly
influenced by this approach, which seems to have guided his thinking on nutritional
deficiency disease along the lines which Aykroyd had already begun to formulate. His
principal research work at the Henry Lester was on beriberi, albeit in biochemical
research and clinical investigation.37 Platt's interests were not limited to the laboratory
and the clinic, however, but encompassed the social context of the disease. His work on
infantile beriberi, for example, led him to study Chinese methods of infant feeding, and
to the observation, in which may be traced echoes of Audrey Richards, that "In any
attempt to improve the dietary of a community, it is preferable to evolve from existing
practices rather than indiscriminately to substitute foreign ones. It is obvious, then, that
these indigenous practices must be known and preferably understood".38 Many years
later when, as a dying man, he addressed his last nutrition class at the LSHTM, he gave a
vivid description of fulminating beriberi as he had seen it in young factory workers in
Shanghai in the 1930s. He had been deeply angered by the knowledge that these
youngsters died because they "were forced to work when they were badly fed", and it
was this anger that fuelled his laboratory researches and helped him to develop an
outlook which saw "the science and logistics of nutrition as inseparable from economics
and sociology as well as from medicine and health".39 As Platt himself noted in one of
his departmental annual reports,
A successful attack on problems of nutrition, in any given country, depends on the activities of
various government ministries, departments and services, research institutes, universities etc.; co-
ordinated into a national programme. Among the fields of work especially concerned are nutrition
itself, health, agriculture, animal husbandry, food technology, education, home economics and
community development.40
34 H G Earle, 'The Institute ofMedical Research, Djen and B S Platt, 'Occasional creatinuria in adult
its origin, nature and functions', National medical Chinese males', ibid., 1: 379-86; B S Platt, 'An
Journal ofChina, 1930, 16: 267-80, p. 277. approach to problems of infant nutrition in China',
35 Ibid. He also wanted to establish a medical Chinese medicalJournal, 1936, 50: 410-24; B S Platt
museum on the successful model ofthe Wellcome and G Lu, 'Chemical and clinical findings in
Museum ofMedical Science in London: ibid., p. 279. beriberi', Q. J. Med., 1936, 5: 355-73.
36 B S Platt, 'Herbert Gastineau Earle', Br. med. J., 38 B S Platt and S Y Gin, 'Chinese methods of
1946, i: 1001. infant feeding and nursing', Archives ofDiseases in
37 Platt's publications from this period included: Childhood, 1938, 13: 343-54, p. 343.
B S Platt and S Y Yin, 'Some observations on a 39 'Benjamin Stanley Platt', Lancet, 1969, ii: 224;
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By the 1930s, the incidence ofberiberi in China was clearly lending itselfto economic
and sociological explanations. In the southern coastal province of Fukien, for example,
the disease was found only in the large cities of Amoy and Foochow, where the diet of
the poorest classes consisted mainly ofhighly polished rice and very limited quantities of
vegetables.41 Further, as Platt himself noted, there was a very marked seasonal
distribution of cases: in Shanghai more than half the cases which presented at the Lester
Chinese Hospital did so in the months July-September, when a smaller variety of
vegetables was available than in the winter months.42 As in Newfoundland, beriberi was
thus a seasonal disorder associated with general undernutrition, often exacerbated by
hard physical labour. The Chinese experience, however, also suggested the power of
education. Observers in Foochow found that the number ofhospital admissions declined
over a five-year period, and noted that "Popular knowledge of the disease exists to some
extent and there is a demand for less highly polished rice among certain classes and this
kind ofrice is carried in the rice shops".43
The experience of China was a crucial formative influence on Platt's professional life,
and shaped an essentially holistic approach to his chosen discipline.44 In an early report
to the LSHTM he noted, "the improvement ofthe nutrition ofbackward peoples must ...
begin with the people themselves and with the development of their immediate
resources".45 T P Eddy later wrote,
Platt always believed that an immediate start should be made with such local resources as there
might be on the prevention and treatment ofundernutrition and the diseases ofpoverty. It was clear
to him that a study of local foods, of local customs and taboos, and education at all levels in the
elementary principles ofnutrition could always effect substantial improvements.46
It was essentially a structural approach, and it was one that persisted in Platt for the rest
ofhis career, despite the swing ofthe tide in the direction oftechnical fixes after 1945.47
Nutrition in the Colonial Empire
In the autumn of 1937, the unofficial war between China and Japan, which had been
simmering since the summer, erupted into action. The Japanese invaded in November,
capturing Shanghai and penetrating inland up the Yangtze River to capture Nanking in
December. The outbreak of war "considerably curtailed" the activities of the Henry
Lester Institute,48 and Platt returned to England, where he obtained a post on the
41 B W Jarvis and T Kang, 'Observations on
beriberi in Fukien Province with special reference to
Foochow', Chinese medicalJournal, 1935, 49:
1150-5.
42 Platt and Yin, op. cit., note 37 above, p. 407; see
also Jarvis and Kang, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 1151.
43 Jarvis and Kang, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 1151.
As the number ofberiberi cases admitted to the
Foochow hospital was very small, the decline in
admissions may have been more apparent than real.
44 Lancet, op. cit., note 39 above, p. 224.
45 LSHTM, Annual report, 1947-48: p. 71.
46 'B. S. Platt', Br. med. J., 1969, iii: p. 243.
47 Platt's career was not unsullied by co-operation
with the advocates oftechnical solutions, as his
behaviour over the Gambia Field Working Party
project demonstrates: see Petty, 'Foreword', op. cit.,
note 6 above, p. 6. None the less, Platt viewed the
rising preoccupation ofthe nutrition community in
the 1950s with kwashiorkor and protein malnutrition
with reservation: see Donald S McLaren, 'The great
protein fiasco', Lancet, 1974, ii: 93-6, p. 93; see also
B S Platt, 'Protein malnutrition-a note on
nomenclature', Proc. Nutr. Soc., 1958, 17: xl-xli,
p. xli; B S Platt and D S Miller, 'The quantity and
quality ofprotein for human nutrition', ibid.,
106-113.
48 Br. med. J., 1946, i: 1001.
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scientific staff of the Medical Research Council. It was a timely return. Although the
MRC had been financing research in nutrition for some years, this had been limited-
like academic nutrition science generally-to biochemical investigations and family diet
surveys.49 Late in 1935, however, Aykroyd and Burnet's report, 'Nutrition and public
health', appeared, and came to the attention of J E Thomas, Secretary of State for the
Colonies.50 In a circular of April 1936, Thomas asked the governors of British colonies
to turn their attention to nutrition. The "surprisingly great" response to this circular
resulted in the setting up of an Advisory Committee on Nutrition, on which the MRC
was represented, to collate the material received.5" The membership of this committee
was distinguished: it included E P Cathcart, Raymond Firth, Audrey Richards, Edward
Mellanby and John Boyd Off. Platt, in ajunior MRC appointment, was not officially on
the Committee, but was sufficiently involved in the preparation of the report for his
assistance to be acknowledged with "special gratitude" by the authors.52
Although the Committee's report, Nutrition in the colonial empire, attracted little
initial attention, and in its final version differed in emphasis from the original draft,53 it
none the less became a document of some influence. According to Aykroyd, it was one
of the key documents considered at the United Nations' 1943 Hot Springs conference, at
which the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation was conceived and its objectives
outlined.54 Secondly, it pulled together a number of strands of thought on the subject of
colonial malnutrition and presented them in an accessible form. In this sense, it helped to
perpetuate a structural perception of nutrition problems beyond the immediate context of
the colonial medical world. John Waterlow, for example, then in his mid-twenties and
just entering on a career in nutrition science, later recorded his sense that the Report was
"one of the first indications that clinical disease is only the tip of the iceberg and that
malnutrition is part of the background of life in large parts of the world". Before this,
wrote Waterlow, deficiency diseases had been thought of as isolated phenomena,
occurring largely in undeveloped countries, in the special circumstances of war, famine
or privation; after, it was recognized that clinical disease was the extreme manifestation
of widespread and generalized malnutrition in large parts ofthe world.55
While the overall emphasis of the Report can be read as stressing "native education"
as the cause of the agricultural problems which brought about colonial malnutrition,
wider concerns were also reflected, notably in the second chapter, 'The importance ofthe
problem'. Here it was stated that the aim of those concerned with nutrition policy
"should not be only the negative one oferadicating deficiency diseases but the wider and
more positive aim of security, so far as economic circumstances and medical knowledge
permit, that populations under their charge secure optimum nutrition". The authors
49 Celia Petty, op. cit., note 10 above, pp. 83-108. 53 Worboys, op. cit., note 7 above, p. 221,
50 Beinart, op. cit., note 20 above, p. 124. considers that the draft and final reports differed
S Medical Research Council, Annual report, substantially in emphasis, the first having a structural
1937-38, London, HMSO, 1939, p. 17. orientation, the second a technical one. Celia Petty
52 Economic Advisory Council, Nutrition in the considers this interpretation arguable: Petty,
colonial empire, PP 1938-39 x (Cmd 6050), p. 63. 'Foreword', op. cit., note 6 above, p. 8 fn 7. I have
Nutritionists closely associated with Platt emphasized not compared the two reports, but I agree with Petty
the part he played in shaping this report. Thus Aykroyd that the final report shows a much greater and more
stated that he was largely responsible for it, while J C significant structural emphasis than Worboys allows.
Waterlow always thought ofit as the 'Platt Report': Br. S 'W. R. A.', 'B. S. Platt', Br. med. J., 1969,3: 364.
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stressed the importance of education and agricultural diversity, especially of crops, but
concluded that, in the final event, the problem of nutrition was "fundamentally an
economic one". Malnutrition, they observed,
will never be cured until peoples of the Colonial Empire command far greater resources than they
do at present . . . From a nutritional point of view . . . the constant aim should be so to increase the
resources ofcolonial peoples that they are able either to purchase or to grow the foodstuffs needed
for satisfactory nutrition.56
Such themes were clearly echoed in the debates and final conclusions of the Hot Springs
conference. Thus the conference's Final Act declared that,
it is useless to produce food unless men and nations have the means to acquire it for consumption.
Freedom from want cannot be achieved unless there is a balanced and world-wide expansion of
economic activity ... Moreover ... poverty is the first cause ofmalnutrition and hunger.57
While the attraction of technical fixes was also evident in the conference proceedings,
recognition of the underlying importance of economic solutions remained a significant
theme in the public expressions of the international community as represented at the Hot
Springs conference.
A World Food Policy
With the return of peace in 1945, the careers of both Aykroyd and Platt took a fresh
turn. Aykroyd was appointed as first Director of the FAO's Nutrition Section in 1946,
and in the same year Platt took up the new Professorship of Human Nutrition at the
LSHTM. In this capacity, he took his place as an expert consultant, advising international
organizations and teaching students from all over the globe.58 Between them, as Director
of the Nutrition Division and expert adviser, and with very similar views on the
economic roots of malnutrition, Aykroyd and Platt exercised a significant influence on
the policies ofthe Food and Agriculture Organisation and associated agencies. While the
story of the FAO's policies and of its work remains to be written, it is plain that the
tension between technical and structural solutions to problems of nutrition and
malnutrition was present from the organization's earliest days. On the one hand, the
"Great Protein Fiasco"-beginning with identification of kwashiorkor, or protein
malnutrition in children, and the distribution of surplus dry skim milk as a solution-
stands out as the ultimate example of the application of the technical fix; and Aykroyd
was especially proud ofhis part in setting up this fix.59 On the otherhand, the recognition
of deficiency diseases as the extreme manifestation of local malnutrition which had
informed the work of both Aykroyd and Platt in the 1930s remained significant, and
contributed to the discouragement of policies designed to relieve specific nutritional
deficiency problems, especially where these would involve tampering with the local
56 Economic Advisory Council, op. cit., note 52 58 Lancet, op. cit., note 31 above, p. 224.
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6451), p. 4. See also UnitedNations conference on Berg, The nutritionfactor. Its role in national
foodandagriculture, HotSprings, Virginia, 1943, development, Washington, DC, The Brookings
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"food ecology" whose integrity it was thought essential to maintain. The application of
this policy was evident in regard to beriberi, the disease which had helped both men to
formulate their ideas on malnutrition; and in its application, it provoked a clash of
scientific cultures which revealed that the perspectives of the new professional applied-
nutrition scientists had departed radically from those of the traditional, laboratory-based
nutrition scientists.
The world of the laboratory nutrition scientists who had laboured to establish the
chemical constituents of a balanced diet altered in the late 1930s. For the laboratory
researchers, as E V McCollum noted, "the end ofan era had been reached" by 1940 with
the identification, isolation and chemical characterization of most of the chemical
substances required for an adequate diet. These nutrition investigators were obliged to
find new objectives.60
Robert R Williams and Vitamin BJ
Among the nutrition scientists obliged to develop new objectives was Robert R
Williams (1886-1965), whose interests had been exclusively focused on the chemistry of
beriberi and the pursuit of vitamin B1 since 1910. Williams was not a scientific
"insider"; among the different scientific communities being established in the nutrition
field in the 1930s he had no recognizable affiliation; but his life-long intellectual passion
was beriberi. The son of an American Baptist missionary, Williams began his career as
chemist with the Philippine Bureau of Science in Manila. He was asked to assist E B
Vedder with his experimental studies on beriberi, searching, as so many were to do, for
that substance in rice-polishings which was curative of beriberi.6' For much of his time
in Manila, Williams appears to have worked largely on his own, or with one other
collaborator.62 When, in 1914, the Philippine government announced its intention of
replacing American civil servants with Filipinos as quickly as practicable, Williams
returned to the United States. In the years that followed, he held various government and
industrial posts, ending his career as director of the chemical laboratories at the Bell
Telephone Laboratories from 1925-46. During these years, that is to say up to 1936, he
continued to work on the chemical problem ofberiberi in his spare time.
By 1933, Williams and his assistants had obtained pure crystals of vitamin B1, and in
1935 they succeeded in synthesizing the vitamin, naming it thiamine. Williams then
patented the process, in order that "the manufacture and sale of the vitamin should be
conducted in a way to ensure that public ends would be served".63 He was anxious that
his discovery should not serve the "mercenary ends" of the big pharmaceutical
companies; he noted in his memoirs, "Though I have departed rather radically from the
theological doctrines of my missionary parents, I have adhered very closely to their
fundamental purpose of ministering to the poor, needy, and ignorant segment of the
world's population".64 Williams's conception of helping the poor and needy differed
60 McCollum, op. c.it., note 14 above, pp. 240-1. 62 Williams, op. cit., note 2 above, ch. 6.
61 Dictionary ofScientific Biography, 16 vols, 63 Ibid., p. 171.
New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970-80, vol. 64 Ibid., p. 169. The profits from Williams's own
14, pp. 393-4; see also Williams, op. cit., note 2 patenting ofthiamine synthesis went to the Williams-
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Harriette Chick, 'The discovery of vitamins', he did not himselfgain financially.
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radically from that of Platt and Aykroyd. While the latter had come to see deficiency
diseases in terms oftheir social and economic context, Williams continued to see beriberi
as, fundamentally, a chemical problem which could be solved by chemical means. The
account of beriberi which he gives in his memoirs is written almost entirely from the
chemical and pathological perspective; observations on beriberi in its cultural setting are
absent. He saw the problem of beriberi as soluble simply by the addition of synthetic
thiamine to the dietary staple (polished rice) of vulnerable populations. On his visits to
Asia after 1945, Williams sought to discover the local incidence of beriberi and to study
the local rice trades with a view to technicalities of thiamine distribution. In this sense,
his views were traditional: like the old colonial administrators, he viewed beriberi as a
question ofpolished or unpolished rice, and not as a problem ofpoverty.
The search for vitamin B1 and the synthesis of thiamine dominated the first half of
Williams's life; a mission to eradicate beriberi dominated the second. With the
development of the synthetic vitamin, it became possible to produce dietary supplements
and to add synthetic vitamins to staple cereals for public health purposes. This is the
process known as enrichment. For the eradication of beriberi, a "premix rice" was
developed, coated with the synthetic vitamin, which was to be mixed with ordinary
supplies ofpolished rice in due proportion. There were problems with premix rice: it was
more expensive than ordinary rice, and in cultures where it was traditional to wash rice
before cooking or to boil it in plenty of water, rather than effectively steaming it in a
small quantity, up to thirty per cent of the added thiamine could be lost in preparation.65
Such drawbacks weighed little with Williams: he was a tireless advocate of enrichment,
whether to prevent pellagra in the southern United States or beriberi in Asia, or to
improve public health anywhere.66 The necessity of enriching rice in beriberi endemic
areas was his particular passion, although he was unable to secure its adoption on any
significant scale during his lifetime.
Williams's failure with rice enrichment went deep. He blamed the FAO, and in
particular "British and European scientists and their pupils in Asia".67 He thought that
they viewed as suspect any commercial interests in connection with any public health
measure, and that because he had patented his synthetic thiamine process both he himself
and rice enrichment had been cold-shouldered by the UN's nutrition establishment.
Widely honoured in America, Williams could not understand how it was that, despite his
work on beriberi and his study of the rice trade in Asia, he was never invited to attend
FAO or WHO conferences, and that the UN never offered any encouragement to rice
enrichment programmes in Asia.68 Williams was bitter. "My record", he felt, entitled him
to involvement in the work of the international agencies, and he counted it as "the
greatest disappointment of my life" that no one in the UN supported his rice enrichment
policies for Asia.69 It was not to be expected that he would recognize himself as an
outsider; but the international nutrition community had effectively established itself
during the 1930s, when Williams was in his lab at Bell, and it was not a community with
which he had established links. Between 1915 and 1925, Williams admitted, he had no
65 FAO Nutritional Studies No. 12, Rice 67 Ibid., p. 172.
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contacts with Dutch or Japanese workers, and very little with British; he does not appear
to have extended his contacts greatly between 1925 and 1935.70 Williams's priority in
publication of the synthesis of thiamine gave him little credit in the eyes of other
nutrition scientists: as Jansen noted, three groups of workers "almost simultaneously"
established the structural formula ofthiamine: Williams and Cline in 1936; Andersag and
Westphal in 1937, and Todd and Bergel also in 1937.7' Williams and Cline's
achievement was not unique. Thirdly, Williams was by no means the only westerner with
a knowledge of the rice trade in the Far East: both Platt and Aykroyd had studied the
subject, and had had better opportunities for study at first hand than Williams's whistle-
stop tours (of a few days or weeks) permitted.72 Finally, of course, Williams's recipe for
the eradication ofberiberi appeared irredeemably old-fashioned when set against the new
perception that deficiency disease was only the tip ofa malnutrition iceberg.
The Bataan Experiment
At the heart of Williams's disappointment with the UN agencies lay the Bataan
Experiment. From October 1948, Williams, with the co-operation of Dr Juan Salcedo of
the Philippine Health Department, organized the experimental distribution of enriched
rice in Bataan Province, the Philippines. The initial phase ofthe experiment, in 1948-50,
appeared to be a success both in reducing the incidence of beriberi and in creating a
demand for enriched rice in neighbouring provinces.73 Encouraged by this, Williams and
Salcedo attempted, from 1950, to extend rice enrichment to larger areas and populations
across the Philippines. The more ambitious project quickly ran into trouble, at first
administrative, later political.74 Williams had, however, already solicited a visit from an
international FAO team, with a view to drawing the attention of that organization, and
other Asian countries, to the rice enrichment experiment and its possibilities. Somewhat
delayed by the activity of communist Huk terrorists, the FAO survey team, financed by
the Williams-Waterman Fund, arrived in February 1952. By this time the rice enrichment
programme was in the throes oftransition from subsidized experiment to self-supporting,
commercially based operation, and encountering considerable difficulties. These,
Williams considered, detracted from the scheme's overall impact on the survey team.
The published version of the team's report, although it praised the Philippine effort,
detailed the financial and organizational difficulties and stated clearly its conviction that
rice enrichment, however fully implemented, "cannot be regarded as a substitute for the
general improvement of the poor rice-eaters"' diet by increasing supplies of other cereals
and protective foods.75
The details of Williams's grievances and of the FAO team's conclusions cannot be
explored here; but the clash of perspectives is almost audible. Williams imputed petty
motives to the survey team: they suspected his commercial involvement, and anyway
disliked Americans.76 W H Sebrell, then Director of the Institute of Nutrition Sciences at
70 Ibid., p. 107 etseq. 73 Williams, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 196-7.
71 Jansen, op. cit., note 2 above, p. 10; Chick, op. 74 Ibid., pp. 196-201, 203-6.
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Columbia University, who introduced Williams's memoirs, was more tactful, and
perhaps nearer the mark: he noted that the FAO's concern for education and food supply
reflected long-term planning rather than immediate short-term measures, although in the
meantime beriberi continued to take its toll.77 Set in the context of the UN and FAO's
stated objectives, the survey team's conclusions were indeed perfectly consistent.
Although the FAO was not above involving itself in immediate measures, as the skim
milk policy suggests, the Hot Springs conference had specifically noted that "the
indiscriminate distribution of synthetic vitamins is not to be recommended as a public-
health procedure".78
The outstanding lesson of the Bataan Experiment was not apparent to Williams,
although Aykroyd, and the FAO, had already taken it on board. This was that, without
the co-operation of the governments concerned, it was impossible to implement
complicated measures of technical assistance like rice enrichment in the poorer countries
of the world.79 In the Philippines, the planned extension of the rice enrichment
programme in the 1950s failed because the central government was unwilling to enforce
the measure.80 Although Williams insisted that rice enrichment was easy to introduce, the
practical record ofthe Philippines at this time did not bear him out, certainly not once the
programme was extended beyond a relatively small area. In other countries where
enrichment programmes were tried-in America, Puerto Rico, Formosa and Cuba-
experience demonstrated that strong government support was a prerequisite for success.81
Williams admitted that the enrichment campaign in the Philippines lacked political
influence, "and perhaps political discernment", and that this had been central to its
failure. He did not draw any general conclusions from his examples, or note the inherent
contradiction in his claim that enrichment was easy to introduce.82
The broad context within which these various enrichment programmes were conducted
had been outlined by Aykroyd as early as 1953. In an article describing the history and
work of the FAO, he drew attention to the difficulties facing the organization. The
FAO's central aims are set out in its constitution. They are: to raise levels of nutrition
and the standard of living; to secure improvement in the efficiency of production and
distribution of all food and agricultural products; and to better the condition of rural
populations and thus contribute towards an expanding world economy. To this end its
functions are essentially educational and advisory; but it is also empowered to furnish
77 Ibid., p. xx.
78 UnitedNationsconference onfoodand
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status ofpeople": Michael C Latham, 'A historical
perspective', in Alan Berg, Nevin S Scrimshaw and
David L Call (eds), Nutrition, nationaldevelopment
andplanning, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1973,
p. 314.
80 Williams, op. cit., note 2 above, pp. 203-6.
81 Ibid., p. 274.
82 Ibid., p. 275. For a general discussion ofthe
advantages and disadvantages offortification
programmes see Berg, op. cit., note 59 above, ch. 8.
He notes that "the fortification ofmilled cereals ...
will not help people in a rural subsistence economy
who grow and grind their own ... a viable
fortification project depends on large-scale central
processing", p. 111.
74Beriberi, Vitamin BJ and WorldFoodPolicy
technical and organizational assistance to governments as requested.83 However, as
Aykroyd noted, technical knowledge gained in economically advanced countries has to
be adapted to the conditions existing in those parts of the world where the knowledge is
needed: "techniques successful in Flanders or Iowa may not work well in Brazil or
Iraq".84 International agency workers have to learn to work with local circumstances. The
crux of progress, according to Aykroyd, lay not in international intervention per se, but
in the existence of strong, socially-committed governments in developing countries.
Government action alone could bridge the gap between the resources ofthe FAO and the
apathy ofpoor and uneducated food producers in underdeveloped countries. Such action,
he observed, "cannot be taken unless governments are stable, strong, efficient and able
and ready to promote the welfare of their peoples". And, he concluded, "these conditions
are rarely fulfilled".85
Against this background, it is not surprising that the FAO had reservations about
advocating rice enrichment on a large scale in Asia, quite apart from its commitment to
raising general standards of living through education and improved food supplies. Strong
and efficient governments were rare in post-war Asia, and rice enrichment, whatever
Williams's claims, was a complicated technical operation which required not only the
restructuring of indigenous rice trades and either the importation of vitamins or capital
investment in pharmaceutical plant, but also the creation of supervisory and enforcement
machinery to ensure the distribution of enriched rice and the suppression of outlets
attempting to sell unenriched rice. To implement such an undertaking across the vast
reach of rice-eating Asia, with its thousands of tiny rice-mills and its various different
ways of preparing rice, would demand an unimaginable investment of man-power and
money, perhaps for relatively little return. By 1971, the rice enrichment programmes
begun in the Philippines, Japan, and Taiwan had demonstrated the negative effect of
dispersed milling facilities, and of the conflicting economic interests of millers,
governments and consumers. In Papua New Guinea alone, a comprehensive enrichment
programme survived.86
Conclusions
The FAO's failure to adopt thorough-going food fortification policies in the years
1945-1970 stemmed not only from the beliefs of the Director of the Nutrition Section
and the terms of its remit, but from a recognition of the political restrictions on technical
assistance. Aykroyd retired in 1966; in 1971, the joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on
Nutrition under the chairmanship ofJohn Waterlow, reviewed the whole question offood
fortification in measured terms and without much enthusiasm. The complexities of
introducing fortification programmes had clearly not diminished with the years; the
essential message ofthe review was contained in two terse sentences: "Evaluations ofthe
83 W R Aykroyd, 'FAO', Nutrition Abstracts and worth pursuing to the extent that they were likely to
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costs and benefits of a fortification programme should always be conducted in the
context ofthe special situation. Ideally each country should have well-defined short-term
and long-term nutritional goals and a co-ordinated plan for achieving these goals".87 The
motivation ofindividual governments remained a significant factor in the achievement of
improved nutrition. To suggest, as Williams and others after him have done,88 that the
UN agencies ignored rice enrichment because they disapproved of "any commercial
intent" is an oversimplification. Once governments began to initiate their own
enrichment programmes, UN support became available.89
Williams's condemnation of what he perceived to be the UN's distrust of commercial
involvement is not without its ironies. Williams himself had patented the synthesis of
thiamine to avoid its exploitation by pharmaceutical companies; his warning that the UN
agencies would never succeed in their objectives without commercial co-operation was
nothing less than contradictory.90 If indeed the British and European nutritionists of the
immediate post-war period mistrusted commercial involvement, history has justified
them. Between 1966 and 1970, the FAO sponsored the introduction ofhigh-yielding rice
varieties into the Philippines. To promote this "Green Revolution", the FAO accepted
that necessary fertilisers and insecticides would be provided through commercial
companies; this acceptance ultimately had devastating effects on the lives of Filipino
farmers.91 Similarly, the role of commercial companies in providing dried skim-milk
powder and formula milks as baby food at the expense of maternal breast-feeding has
come under attack in recent years. The pros and cons of involving commercial
companies in nutrition programmes was noted succinctly by Ben Platt in 1958, at the
time when the companies were becoming interested in supplying protein foods to the
developing world. Advantage lay in the companies' technical staff, who could develop
local products into cheap and acceptable foods, and the machinery and technical
expertise which enabled them to process food cheaply and efficiently; but, "because
commercial companies must make a profit, there is always the danger that they may be
led into policies ofproducing materials which, whilst having a ready sale, may not be of
any great nutritional value". Having been approached by the companies many times for
advice, however, Platt had become convinced that they could play an important part in
overcoming protein malnutrition. One ofhis objectives, as expert adviser, was to suggest
ways in which the danger ofcommercial exploitation could be avoided.92
In the meanwhile, however, beriberi began to decline as a public health problem in
Asia, and by the early 1970s morbidity and mortality from the disease had been markedly
reduced. The role which rice enrichment played in this reduction seems to have been
small. Michael Latham considered important factors to include public awareness of the
disease as a result of nutrition education; an increase in the variety of food eaten even by
the poor in Asian countries; deliberate programmes of rice treatment such as enrichment;
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and public health measures such as the prophylactic consumption of thiamine tablets and
early treatment of cases of the disease. "Technology allied with science", he observed,
"with economic development, and with public health measures has led to its decline".93
A combination of structural and technical developments, in other words, brought about
this much-to-be desired result. While on the one hand the great reduction in beriberi may
be in part due to the United Nations' policy of encouraging the provision and
consumption of as wide a variety of foodstuffs as possible as a first step towards
improving nutritional levels, an approach which, they noted in 1943, might be especially
important in eastern and tropical countries where a considerable proportion of the
population did not get enough to eat,94 there has probably been considerable variation in
importance between factors at local level. The story of beriberi in China, for example,
demonstrates the power of strong government, and, incidentally, how this removes any
need for more complicated measures: after 1949, the Chinese government imposed
regulations controlling the degree of extraction permitted in machine-milled rice, and
residents of the southern cities affected by the disease were encouraged to eat only
lightly milled (92 per cent extraction) rice and under-milled (81 per cent extraction)
wheat-flour, with the result that beriberi disappeared.95
In the final event, the importance ofberiberi for public health nutrition transcended the
contentious issue of enrichment and fortification.96 Research on beriberi convinced key
nutrition workers that deficiency disease was the extreme manifestation of general
malnutrition, and in this sense beriberi helped to determine the FAO's brieffor a general
improvement in living standards, for a world food policy aimed at long-term
improvement across the nutritional spectrum rather than at short-term, piecemeal attacks
on specific deficiency diseases. The increasing complexity of the post-war development
field, the involvement of WHO, and the growing obsession of the international nutrition
community with protein-energy malnutrition, are all likely to have contributed to the
favouring of single-sector interventions in the 1950s and 1960s. The beriberi story
testifies, however, to the existence of competing technical and structural solutions to
nutritional problems from the earliest emergence of applied nutrition as a discipline in
the 1920s, as well as to the subsequent continuing play between the two approaches in
the wider fields ofapplied nutrition and development planning.
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